

**THE FORENSICS FILES**



Compete Prepared

Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.

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September-October 2010

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## Topic Overview:

### Part I: Introduction

On August 6, 1945 the existence of atomic weapons was dramatically, and lethally, announced to the world when the United States dropped an atomic bomb, called Little Boy, on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. This event, as well as the subsequent atomic bombing of the Japanese city of Nagasaki, and the possession of these weapons have the subject of great controversy ever since. The reason for this is the sheer devastation that these weapons are capable of. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted in 120,000 deaths instantly and as many as 100,000 more deaths from the effects of the radiation by the end of the war. (These numbers are estimates as the true number of deaths may never fully be known.) The property and environmental damage was also extreme. In Hiroshima, for example, everything within a 3 mile radius was either instantly destroyed or heavily damaged. The destruction reached as far as 12 miles from the bomb site. These two atomic bombs were primitive compared to modern nuclear weapons. Modern nuclear weapons are much more destructive.

The bombs dropped upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki were atomic bombs. The other type of nuclear weapon is called thermo nuclear weapons and these are far more destructive. These weapons can be near a thousand times more powerful than the bombs dropped upon Japan to end the end the Pacific part of the Second World War. The dropping of even one of these bombs could be unimaginably devastating for the country attacked, worse, could generate a radiation cloud that might pass over other nations like a horrifying storm destroying property and lives wherever it goes. If there were a small exchange of nuclear weapons the damage could be devastating. Douglas Roche explains in "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to

Join the Sect” for Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008 that even a limited nuclear engagement would have devastating impacts for the planet. Roche writes, “The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, recently published the results of research showing that even a "limited" nuclear war would damage the earth's climate in profound, long-lasting ways. Sudden and persistent global cooling would lead to crop failures and massive famine and epidemics of infectious diseases. These findings are derived from regional nuclear war scenarios that are easy to envision as nuclear weapons start to spread to additional countries.” Obviously, a larger exchange could be even more dangerous, some claim it could lead to extinction.

All of this was written because modern students have grown up in an era where the threat they hear about is terrorism and not nuclear winter. The author of this overview, as well as many coaches, grew up in an era, The Cold War, where the threat of nuclear devastation hung over our heads daily. Countless articles were written, movies were made about it, including *The Day After* and the amazing *Dr. Strangelove*, pop stars sang songs about it. In other words, this was once a much bigger issue. When the Cold War, the ongoing state of tension and conflict between the USA and the USSR from 1945-1991, ended, the world breathed a collective sigh of relief believing this threat of severe nuclear devastation, was now over. Since, then, many have moved on and we have pondered and faced new threats. However, there are those who never stopped warning of the dangers of possessing these weapons. This sigh may have been very premature. Both the USA and Russia still possess thousands of these weapons on high alert ready to be launched at the slightest hint of nuclear aggression from the other side. More nations are seeking to get their hands on nuclear weapons. One of the justifications given for the War in Iraq was to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons and now, Iran, a known

sponsor of terrorism, is reportedly seeking these weapons. This is even more dangerous because many terrorists, and their leaders, seem willing to die for their cause meaning they may be more likely to use nuclear weapons than leaders in the USA or the USSR were ever really willing to do.

So, this topic could hardly be more relevant or timelier to modern students who may not have given nuclear weapons much thought. Advocates of disarmament have interesting arguments that possession sparks proliferation of nuclear weapons while disarming would be very effective at ending proliferation of these weapons. Ending proliferation would mean no generation would have to live with the constant threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over their heads. Supporters of nuclear weapons believe that this is an unrealistic fairy tale that would only endanger the US and its interests. This debate has raged on for decades and there is an abundant amount of literature on it. Researching the affirmative was easier than the negative as it seems opponents of nuclear weapons are more prolific. This may be because they are losing the debate, and have been for decades. As previously mentioned, the US still possesses nuclear weapons and the vast majority of people in the US still support this policy despite the significant and interesting arguments made by advocates of nuclear disarmament. So, there seems to be an affirmative advantage in researching this topic but an advantage for the negative in popular sentiment. That may well be as it should be, at least for the purposes of competitive high school debate.

## Part II: The Affirmative

There are almost as many ways to affirm as there will be rounds at an average tournament. As mentioned previously, there is no shortage of literature on the topic. The value in most rounds will be morality because of the word 'ought' in the resolution which suggests

morality and so the resolution asks if possessing nuclear weapons is immoral. However, that does not really limit the affirmative in any way because there are countless moral theories and much of the affirmative literature is reflective of this perspective. One argument for the immorality of possessing nuclear weapons is that they are practically useless in modern military conflict where we attempt to limit collateral damage, the killing of innocents. This is also true because modern wars are not really against states but non state actors and so warfare is more like police actions. Hence, we cannot use them and so any and every risk inherent in possessing them is an unnecessary risk of immoral hazards.

The first affirmative case we offer defends the value of morality, as do all our cases, because of the word ought in the resolution which is defined as to “be morally right: indicates that somebody has a duty or obligation to do something or that it is morally right to do something.” This means the question of the resolution is one about the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. The case defends a necessary component of morally claiming for something to be moral, it must be done with a moral intent. The case quotes James Dunham to defend this where he writes, “We are obliged to study the motive and the intent, the desires and the kind of thing desired, before a true moral judgment can be reached. Hence, a systematic analysis of mental phenomena is imperative as a prerequisite to the determination of consistent moral values.” This means that the proper criterion for evaluating the morality of states possessing nuclear weapons is establishing moral intent. The thesis of this case is that possession of nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intent and so cannot be moral. The first point of the case argues that the possession of nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intentions. This is because the possession of nuclear weapons reveals intent to deliberately murder millions of innocent people, an action that cannot possibly be moral as it threatens the mass violation of the

right to life, the very foundation of morality, and so can only be immoral intent. The case then argues that if a particular action is immoral, the threat to do it is also immoral. This means the very act of deterrence with nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intent because it is premised on the threat to perform an immoral action and so this is enough to affirm and turns any negative argument about the necessity or success of deterrence. Finally the case argues that for nuclear deterrence to be credible, a nation must possess the immoral will to use nuclear weapons. This means that we can know for certain the intent of nuclear states as for deterrence to be successful, it must rest on contemplated contingency plans for the actual use of these weapons meaning that officials and military personnel have certainly pondered when and how these weapons might be deployed meaning their intent cannot be moral, and any argument that we cannot know intent are flawed.

The second affirmative case also defends the value of morality but argues that the greatest threat to life, the foundation of morality, is nuclear proliferation. The case then quotes Ramesh Thakur who writes, "Given the possibility of wars, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can justifiably be posited as one of the greatest security problems facing the post-Cold War world." It further quotes Thakur where he writes, "Opponents fear that nuclearisation would trigger a fresh round of conventional arms escalation in the region and unleash diplomatic and military forces with unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences." This means the criterion must be ending nuclear proliferation. The thesis of this case is that possession of nuclear weapons does lead to proliferation and so cannot be moral. The first point of this case is that the threat of nuclear proliferation could be avoided if nuclear states disarmed and the entire nuclear infrastructure were abolished. This means disarming would end the threat of proliferation by abolishing the infrastructure necessary for constructing and proliferating in

nuclear weapons. This is enough to affirm because it means affirming can end proliferation. The second point argues that proliferation is seen as the rational security response to nuclear states. This means that as long as states possess nuclear weapons, other states will want them as they will be seen as crucial to the defense of their state. This is enough to affirm because it means affirming can end proliferation by ending the motivation to proliferate. The last point argues that efforts to end nuclear proliferation are undermined by states possessing nuclear weapons. This means possessing nuclear weapons undermines any efforts to end proliferation as the nations seeking to end proliferation are seen as hypocritical and so this is enough to affirm because it means ending proliferation cannot happen when states possess nuclear weapons.

An important argument for the affirmative to prepare for is deterrence. Deterrence, or the theory that the possession of nuclear weapons discourages major powers from attacking each other, is probably the most powerful and persuasive argument that the negative possesses. One way to attack deterrence is to argue that deterrence fails against agents who have the will to both die and kill for their cause. For example, terrorists have demonstrated a willingness to use suicide as a weapon against innocents and take shelter behind innocents. If these groups were to gain possession of nuclear weapons, and they are willing to die, they will not be deterred from using them. Additionally it could be argued that deterrence has failed against some of the groups. Certainly nuclear weapons did not deter Al Qaeda from attacking the US on September 11, 2001. Still another argument is that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is exaggerated because the peace between nuclear nations is more likely caused by increasing economic interdependency as opposed to the threat of nuclear deterrence. Finally, the fact that Pakistan and India have had military battles despite both nations being nuclear nations seems to demonstrate that nuclear deterrence is not that effective of a deterrent.

## Part II: The Negative

The advantage of negating, as previously mentioned, is that the majority of people seem to agree that possession of nuclear weapons, at least for the US, is necessary and probably moral because of this necessity. The disadvantage of negating is that there are not that many arguments on the negative side. There is one argument that seems implicit in almost every negative position and that is deterrence. For example, one negative is argument on the negative side is that disarming would leave the US vulnerable; vulnerable because we would be less able to deter attacks. Another is that nuclear weapons maintain stable relationships among the superpowers; this is because these weapons deter the superpowers from attacking each other. Another is that the US needs nuclear weapons to protect its allies, but this too rests upon nuclear deterrence as it would be this deterrence that theoretically protects US allies. Hence, even arguments that may not, on the surface, rely on deterrence, do rely on deterrence. This means the negative would be prudent to prepare to defend both the effectiveness and morality of the theory of deterrence or the negative may not be too successful in many rounds.

The first negative case we offer defends the value of morality, for the same reasons as the affirmative cases but argues that the way to achieve morality is by embracing a foreign policy of self interest. The case quote Peter Schwartz who writes, “the designers of a rational foreign policy would understand that self-interest can be successfully defended only if it is embraced as a consistent, *moral* principle—a principle in keeping with America’s founding values.” This means that the moral duty of the US government is to fully embrace a foreign policy of self interest so as not to sacrifice the interests and even lives of its citizens for the interests and lives other nations, especially enemy nations.” So the criterion to achieve the value is embracing a foreign policy of self interest. The thesis of this case is that possessing nuclear weapons is in the self interest of the United States and so is moral. The first point in this case argues that nuclear weapons are

necessary to deter attacks on vital interests of the US. This means that possession of nuclear weapons is in the self interest of the US as they deter attacks on our interests. The second point argues that affirming would make the US vulnerable. This means that getting rid of nuclear weapons would make the US vulnerable to attack from nations who developed them in the future

The second negative case defends the value of morality but argues the way to achieve morality is by avoiding war. War is inherently destructive to property and to the environment so it destroys what is necessary for life and life must be the basis, the foundation, of any moral code. Additionally, war asks citizens to become destroyers and killers as opposed to productive individuals. Citizens of a nation are asked to destroy, burn, and kill the property and people who could be fellow citizens or strangers from another land. In other words, it requires people to perform acts that they would generally consider immoral. War results in death, meaning it destroys the foundation of morality and many, if not most, of these lives are innocent lives who have had no say in the decisions of those in power. Finally, war is immoral because it is inherently destructive. Life requires productivity and so war is, in its essence, anti-life. So, the criterion to achieve morality must be reducing the chances of war. The first point of this case is that nuclear weapons make maintaining peace essential for powerful states. This means that nuclear weapons force the most powerful nations on earth to always consider peaceful alternatives to war because going to war is too dangerous for either side. This means possessing nuclear weapons deters war and so is moral. The second point argues that there is no alternative to nuclear weapons for making war obsolete. This means that there exists no alternative to nuclear weapons that could be successful in deterring war so if we affirm, increased war is inevitable meaning negating is the only moral option.

One negative approach that is slightly different from deterrence is that proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable. This is because the technology is already “out there.” While researching this file, this author came across a website that purported to explain how to build a nuclear weapon. This author has absolutely no way to verify if the site is accurate, but the point is that even if all current nuclear states disarmed, and abolished the infrastructure needed to create and test nuclear weapons, the knowledge of how to construct them would still exist and so states could always, eventually, construct nuclear weapons independently. This argument is powerful because much of the possession argument rests upon the notion that disarmament would end proliferation, however, this seems unrealistic. Thus, disarming would effectively only change the balance of power rather than easing concerns about nuclear disaster.

This is a powerful and important topic for debaters to learn about. As always, keep your judge in mind. Younger judges are more likely to be against nuclear weapons as college students tend to be more idealistic. Older judges are more likely to support possession as necessary. Of course, this is not categorically true, but as debate is ultimately about persuading judges, bearing this in mind will help. Best of luck from TFF!!

## Definitions

Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.

State

- 1 A specific mode of government
- 2 A body politic, especially one constituting a nation
- 3 One of the more or less internally autonomous territorial and political units composing a federation under a sovereign government
- 4 Of or relating to a body politic or to an internally autonomous territorial or political unit constituting a federation under one government

*Source: American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*

State

- 1 **mostly autonomous region of federal country:** an area forming part of a federal country such as the United States or Australia with its own government and legislature and control over most of its own internal affairs
- 2 **country:** a country or nation with its own sovereign independent government
- 3 **government:** a country's government and those government-controlled institutions that are responsible for its internal administration and its relationships with other countries
- 4 **relating to government:** involving or relating to the government of a nation or an autonomous federal region within a nation
- 5 **held or run by state:** owned, operated, or financed by a nation or an autonomous region within a federalized nation

*Source: Encarta® World English Dictionary, North American Edition*

State

- 1 a body of persons constituting a special class in a society
- 2 the members or representatives of the governing classes assembled in a legislative body
- 3 : a politically organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory ; *especially* : one that is sovereign
- 4 the political organization of such a body of people
- 5 a government or politically organized society having a particular character
- 6 the operations or concerns of the government of a country
- 7 one of the constituent units of a nation having a federal government

*Source: Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 11th Edition*

State

- 1 a country or its government
- 2 a part of a large country with its own government, such as in Germany, Australia or the US

*Source: Cambridge International Dictionary of English*

Ought

1. be morally right: indicates that somebody has a duty or obligation to do something or that it is morally right to do something

2. be important: indicates that something is important or a good idea
3. be probable: indicates probability or expectation
4. be wished for: indicates a desire or wish.
5. should be case: indicates that something should be the case but may not be

*Source: Encarta® World English Dictionary, North American Edition*

- Ought
1. used to indicate duty or correctness.
  2. used to indicate something that is probable.
  3. used to indicate a desirable or expected state.
  4. used to give or ask advice

*Source: Compact Oxford English Dictionary*

- Ought
- used to show when it is necessary, desirable or advantageous to perform  
the activity referred to by the following verb

*Source: Cambridge International Dictionary of English*

- Ought
1. Used to indicate obligation or duty:
  2. Used to indicate advisability or prudence:
  3. Used to indicate desirability:
  4. Used to indicate probability or likelihood:

*Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*

- Not
- 1 used to form or express a negative.
  - 2 less than

*Source: Compact Oxford English Dictionary*

- Not
- In no way; to no degree. Used to express negation, denial, refusal, or prohibition

*Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*

- Not
- 1 **not at all** used as a polite way of acknowledging somebody's thanks
  - 2 **not that** used to introduce a clause that explicitly denies something that the listener might infer from a previous or subsequent statement

*Source: Encarta® World English Dictionary, North American Edition*

- Not
- used to indicate negation, disagreement, refusal, or prohibition

*Source: The Wordsmyth English Dictionary-Thesaurus*

- Possess
- 1 To have as property; own
  - 2 To have as a quality, characteristic, or other attribute
  - 3 To acquire mastery of or have knowledge of
  - 4 To gain or exert influence or control over; dominate
  - 5 To control or maintain (one's nature) in a particular condition
  - 6 To cause to own, hold, or master something, such as property or knowledge

7 To cause to be influenced or controlled, as by an idea or emotion

*Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*

**Possess**     **1** to have and hold as property : **OWN**  
                  **2** to have as an attribute, knowledge, or skill  
                  **3** to take into one's **possession**  
                  **4** to enter into and control firmly : **DOMINATE**  
                  **5** to bring or cause to fall under the influence, **possession**, or control of some  
                  emotional or intellectual response or reaction

*Source: Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 11th Edition*

**Possess**     to have or own something, or to have a particular quality

*Source: Cambridge International Dictionary of English*

**Possess**     **1** to have as one's own property  
                  **2** to have as a characteristic or quality.  
                  **3** to have knowledge of  
                  **4** of ideas or emotions, to control or dominate the actions of

*Source: The Wordsmyth English Dictionary-Thesaurus*

**Nuclear Weapons**     an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter; a modern thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than a thousand kilograms can produce an explosion comparable to the detonation of more than a billion kilograms of conventional high explosive.<sup>[1]</sup> Even small nuclear devices can devastate a city. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control has been a major aspect of international policy since their debut

*Source: Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*

**Nuclear Weapons**     Weapons of mass destruction that are powered by nuclear reaction. Types of nuclear weapons include atom bombs, hydrogen bombs, fission bombs, and fusion bombs

*Source: Legal dictionary*

**Nuclear Weapons**     A device, such as a bomb or warhead, whose great explosive power derives from the release of nuclear energy

*Source: Answers.com*

**Nuclear Weapons**     A weapon of mass destruction whose explosive power derives from a nuclear reaction

*Source: Word Web Online*

## Affirmative Cases

I affirm the resolution, “Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.” Affirming achieves the value of morality defined by The Encarta Word English Dictionary as “standards of conduct that are generally accepted as right or proper” This is the best definition of morality because it properly conceptualizes the common idea of what morality is. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word ‘ought’ in the resolution which is defined by the same source as “be morally right: indicates that somebody has a duty or obligation to do something or that it is morally right to do something.” So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. So the burden of either side is to demonstrate the morality or immorality of state possession of nuclear weapons. A necessary condition of morality is moral intent. James H. Dunham explains in his book Principles of Ethics p. 22-23 writing, “We may pause for a moment to point out one distinguishing feature of the moral act. How does it differ from the æsthetic? We study with consuming interest the discoverable forms of beauty. Why does this seascape with its rugged headlands, its curving shore and undulating plain, move the observer to sympathetic approval? Matters of taste may awaken discordant feelings, but matters of æsthetic judgment evoke a common assent. In the formulation of practical ends, however, the decision is rarely unanimous. "O marvellous harmony," exclaims Kant with subtle irony, "What Emperor Charles V wants, that Francis I of France wishes also--namely, Milan!" In fact, the emotional reactions may be identical, whatever the choice happens to be, but the underlying motives may be so far apart as to make us wonder whether the two men live in the same moral universe. There is therefore something in the contents of the moral act that gives it greater significance to the average man than any

conception of beauty. We are obliged to study the motive and the intent, the desires and the kind of thing desired, before a true moral judgment can be reached. Hence, a systematic analysis of mental phenomena is imperative as a prerequisite to the determination of consistent moral values.” Thus for an action to be moral, it must be performed through good moral intent. If it is not, it cannot be moral regardless of the effects that it causes. At best, it can only be amoral, at worst, immoral. This means that the proper criterion for evaluating the morality of states possessing nuclear weapons is establishing moral intent. If I can prove that possessing nuclear weapons cannot have moral intent than possessing nuclear weapons cannot be moral.

Additionally, it means that even if the negative can prove that possession of nuclear weapons leads to positive effects, these effects cannot be considered moral unless my case is refuted and the negative establishes possessing can be done with good intent.

Before I continue allow me to define the following terms from the Encarta Word English Dictionary and Word Web Online:

State                    **country:** a country or nation with its own sovereign independent government

Possess                **own something:** to have or own something

Nuclear Weapons     A weapon of mass destruction whose explosive power derives from a nuclear reaction

The thesis of my case is that possession of nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intent and so cannot be moral.

**A. The possessions of nuclear weapons is revealing of only immoral intentions.**

Ramesh Thakur, “Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,” New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

There are several strands in the moral case against nuclear weapons. First, nuclear deterrence openly contemplates -- indeed must be directly based on -- the deliberate killing of people in the millions. There is also something distasteful about the way in which strategists talk of a nuclear war as a 'nuclear exchange', as though it was a commonplace transaction in the village market. Provocations grave enough to warrant nuclear strikes are likely to come from dictatorships, not democracies. The citizens of such regimes are persecuted victims of their own governments. That being so, is it not immoral to visit nuclear punishment upon innocent people for the sins of their leaders? Third, the only goal of nuclear retaliation when deterrence has failed would be revenge. The disproportionate and indiscriminate scale of nuclear retaliatory vengeance can surely not be reconciled with any self-respecting moral doctrine.

This means the possession of nuclear weapons reveals intent to deliberately murder millions of innocent people, an action that cannot possibly be moral as it intends the mass violation of the right to life, the very foundation of morality, and so can only be immoral intent.

**B. If a particular act is immoral, then the threat to perform the action must also be immoral.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Deterrence rests on the threat to wage nuclear war. If a particular act is evil, then the threat to do it must also be immoral; if nuclear war is evil, then threatening and preparing for such war is also morally wrong. The UN Charter expresses the global consensus about certain ethical values and norms of behaviour in international relations. 'Threaten

No Evil' as a moral stricture is written into the UN Charter's Article 2.4: 'All members shall refrain from the threat or use of force' (emphasis added).

This means the very act of deterrence with nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intent because it is premised on the threat to perform an immoral action and so this is enough to affirm and turns any negative argument about the necessity or success of deterrence.

**C. For nuclear deterrence to be credible, a nation must possess the immoral will to use them.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

How can nuclear deterrence be reconciled with the immorality of fighting a nuclear war? Deterrence to be credible must convince the opponent that nuclear weapons will be used when put to the test. The threat to use nuclear weapons therefore needs to be backed up by contingency planning and preparations. A country cannot underwrite nuclear deterrence with an open policy of not using them.

This means that we can know for certain the intent of nuclear states as for deterrence to be successful, it must rest on contemplated contingency plans for the actual use of these weapons meaning that officials and military personnel have certainly pondered when and how these weapons might be deployed meaning their intent cannot be moral, and any argument that we cannot know intent is flawed. Additionally, it further functions to turn any negative argument that these weapons are needed for deterrence because it shows that successful deterrence is only possible through immoral intent.

The state possession of nuclear weapons is immoral because it is revealing of immoral intent. As intent is a necessary component of morality, state possession of nuclear weapons cannot meet this necessary standard and so we must affirm.

I affirm the resolution, “Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.” Affirming achieves the value of morality defined by The Encarta Word English Dictionary as “standards of conduct that are generally accepted as right or proper” This is the best definition of morality because it properly conceptualizes the common idea of what morality is. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word ‘ought’ in the resolution which is defined by the same source as “be morally right: indicates that somebody has a duty or obligation to do something or that it is morally right to do something.” So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. So the burden of either side is to demonstrate the morality or immorality of the possession of state possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to life in the post Cold War era. Ramesh Thakur writes in “Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,” for the New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997. Thakur writes, “Fourth, there are identifiable benefits of a nuclear-free world for different classes of states in terms of their nuclear-weapons status. In the old security agenda, many states were interested in seeking security through nuclear weapons. Now, most seek security from nuclear weapons. A record number of countries -- 178 -- had become party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the time that it was renewed indefinitely in May 1995. The treaty has the widest membership of any arms control agreement in human history. It is also the centrepiece of the global non-proliferation regime which codified the international political norm of non-nuclear-weapons status. Given the possibility of wars, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can justifiably be posited as one of the greatest security problems facing the post-Cold War world.” This is because acquisition of nuclear weapons could trigger violence in unstable parts of the world. Ramesh Thakur continues writing, “Opponents fear that

nuclearisation would trigger a fresh round of conventional arms escalation in the region and unleash diplomatic and military forces with unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences. India would simply be buying into insecurity at higher levels of military sophistication and expenditure visa-vis China and Pakistan. It would become an object of targeting doctrines by the nuclear-weapons states. Its political credibility would be damaged in the nonaligned world and its search for Western-linked economic and technological growth would suffer reverses. There would be opportunity costs for development projects. Its relations with other South Asian countries would also be seriously aggravated. The regional security environment would deteriorate greatly, accompanied by a rise in levels of fear and distrust. The nuclear option could also prove to be a major cost-multiplier if India found itself competing with the nuclear powers in building up significant nuclear arsenals, modern delivery systems and survivable basing, command and control systems. Moreover, the arsenal would have to be underpinned by an intellectual apparatus of deterrence that has so far been notably missing in India.” This means proliferation can trigger instability and instability could trigger violence and war. War, between nuclear states increases the chances of the use of nuclear weapons which means mass deaths in warring nations and mass deaths in neighboring nations from floating radioactive clouds meaning preventing proliferation is the only way to be moral because it reduces the chance of violence and the mass deaths of innocents and so ending nuclear proliferation is the criterion to achieve morality. If I prove the possession of nuclear weapons increases the chances of proliferation, than it cannot be moral as it leads to dangerous proliferation and possible mass death.

Before I continue allow me to define the following terms from the Encarta Word English Dictionary and Word Web Online:

State	<b>country:</b> a country or nation with its own sovereign independent government
Possess	<b>own something:</b> to have or own something
Nuclear Weapons	A weapon of mass destruction whose explosive power derives from a nuclear reaction

The thesis of my case is that possession of nuclear weapons does lead to proliferation and so cannot be moral.

**A. The threat of nuclear proliferation could be avoided if nuclear states disarmed and the entire nuclear infrastructure were abolished.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

The probability of 'nuclear breakout' can be decreased, even if not eliminated, by abolishing not just nuclear weapons but also the whole infrastructure underpinning the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons, including research, deployment, delivery, C31 systems, and nuclear doctrines; and then investing the new nuclear-free regime with optimum transparency and verification, including 'any time any place' right of inspection, by an international authority. We could then have in place interlocking systems of global and regional control and verification machinery. Moreover, all the regimes must be continually widened with the goal of universal adherence, and they must be invested with the requisite political will, fiscal means and intelligence support. Developing countries need to be drawn into their management bodies; otherwise the normative consensus on non-proliferation will decline.

This means disarming would end the threat of proliferation by abolishing the infrastructure necessary for constructing and proliferating in nuclear weapons. This is enough to affirm because it means affirming can end proliferation.

**B. Proliferation is seen as the rational security response to nuclear states.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

The proliferation process in South Asia is driven by a combination of historical antagonism and genuine security fears. The acquisition of a deterrent weapons posture is regarded by policy-makers as a rational response to perceived threat. There is a broad national consensus supporting India's need for a missile-based nuclear deterrent. India perceives the nuclear option as a cost-effective 'political force multiplier' against China's nuclear-weapons status and conventional superiority. The destabilising effects of India's nuclear option on relations with Pakistan are regarded by New Delhi as regrettable but acceptable 'collateral damage'.

This means that as long as states possess nuclear weapons, other states will want them as they will be seen as crucial to the defense of their state. This is enough to affirm because it means affirming can end proliferation by ending the motivation to proliferate.

**C. Efforts to end nuclear proliferation are undermined by states possessing nuclear weapons.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

American officials are irritated by the Indian 'rhetoric' of Non-Proliferation Treaty discrimination; Indians are irritated by the US failure to grasp the self-evident reality of

treaty discrimination. Especially with the end of the Cold War, strategic threats to the United States are uncertain. Yet Washington, with the world's most powerful military arsenal at its disposal, insists on the right to deal with its diffuse and uncertain threats with nuclear weapons. But it insists that India, despite facing clearly identifiable threats to its security from China and Pakistan, must forgo the nuclear option.

This means possessing nuclear weapons undermines any efforts to end proliferation as the nations seeking to end proliferation are seen as hypocritical and so this is enough to affirm because it means ending proliferation cannot happen when states possess nuclear weapons.

## Negative Cases

I negate the resolution, “Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.” Negating achieves the value of morality defined by The Encarta Word English Dictionary as “standards of conduct that are generally accepted as right or proper” This is the best definition of morality because it properly conceptualizes the common idea of what morality is. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word ‘ought’ in the resolution which is defined by the same source as “be morally right: indicates that somebody has a duty or obligation to do something or that it is morally right to do something.” So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. So the burden of either side is to demonstrate the morality or immorality of the possession of state possession of nuclear weapons. To be moral, the US must embrace an all-encompassing foreign policy of self-interest. Peter Schwartz writes in The Foreign Policy of Self-Interest: A Moral Ideal for America, p. 12, 2004, “The advocates of such a policy would reject any duty to sacrifice the wealth and the lives of Americans to the needs of other nations. And they would not seek the approval of other countries before deciding to use force to guard America's interests. Under such a foreign policy, Washington would not attempt to defend America in fits and starts, futilely trying to straddle the two roads of self-interest and self-sacrifice, attacking one terror-sponsor today while mollifying others the next day. Nor would it attempt to uphold self-interest as an amoral expediency—as advocated by the impractical pragmatists and their school of *realpolitik*. Rather, the designers of a rational foreign policy would understand that self-interest can be successfully defended only if it is embraced as a consistent, *moral* principle—a principle in keeping with America's founding values.” This means that the moral duty of the US government is to fully embrace a foreign policy of self interest so as not to sacrifice the interests and even lives of its citizens for the interests and lives other nations, especially enemy

nations.” So the criterion to achieve the value is embracing a foreign policy of self interest. If I prove that possessing nuclear weapons is in the self interest of the US, than it is moral for the US to possess them.

Additionally, my criterion or case must be fully refuted before the affirmative case can be considered because if my case stands, then affirming represents the US government immorally sacrificing its interests.

The thesis of my case is that possessing nuclear weapons is in the self interest of the United States and so is moral.

**A. Nuclear weapons are necessary to deter attacks on vital interests of the US.**

Stephen M. Younger, “Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century,” Western States Legal Foundation, June 27, 2000

Nuclear weapons are one component of an integrated defense strategy that includes diplomacy and conventional forces. The principal role of nuclear weapons was and continues to be that of deterring any potential adversaries from an attack on America or our vital interests. This role is expected to continue for as long as nuclear weapons hold the appellation of “supreme” instruments of military force. However, this does not mean that their role in military planning will not change at all. Changes in the geopolitical environment and the inexorable advance of military technology here and abroad suggest that the position of nuclear weapons in national security policy will evolve with time.

This means that possession of nuclear weapons is in the self interest of the US as they deter attacks on our interests.

**B. Affirming would make the US more vulnerable.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

A world without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with them, Mr. Schlesinger argues. "If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear weapons," he says, "what we would have is a number of countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors of breakout capabilities -- for intimidation purposes. . . . and finally, probably, a number of small clandestine stockpiles." This would make the U.S. more vulnerable.

This means that getting rid of nuclear weapons would make the US vulnerable to attack from nations who developed them in the future.

I negate the resolution, “Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.” Negating achieves the value of morality defined by The Encarta Word English Dictionary as “standards of conduct that are generally accepted as right or proper” This is the best definition of morality because it properly conceptualizes the common idea of what morality is. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word ‘ought’ in the resolution which is defined by the same source as “be morally right: indicates that somebody has a duty or obligation to do something or that it is morally right to do something.” So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. So the burden of either side is to demonstrate the morality or immorality of the possession of state possession of nuclear weapons. In order to be moral, a state must do everything within its power to avoid war. This is because of the obvious immorality of war. War is inherently destructive to property and to the environment so it destroys what is necessary for life and life must be the basis, the foundation, of any moral code. Additionally, war asks citizens to become destroyers and killers as opposed to productive individuals. Citizens of a nation are asked to destroy, burn, and kill the property and people who could be fellow citizens or strangers from another land. In other words, it requires people to perform acts that they would generally consider immoral. War results in death, meaning it destroys the foundation of morality and many, if not most, of these lives are innocent lives who have had no say in the decisions of those in power. Finally, war is immoral because it is inherently destructive. Life requires productivity and so war is, in its essence, anti-life. So, the criterion to achieve morality must be reducing the chances of war. If I prove that nuclear weapons perform this function, than they must be moral. Remember, negating will always outweigh any other moral concern because it prevents a massive moral atrocity.

The thesis of my case is that nuclear weapons are essential for preventing war because the make war unthinkable.

**A. Nuclear weapons make maintaining peace essential for powerful states.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

The most basic argument is that nuclear weapons (and only they) transform peace among the most powerful states in the world from something that is nice to have but secondary to essential security interests as seen by governments, into the essential security interest of governments and governed alike. It does this at some risk of potential catastrophe. If we were in a world of stable states with no rival territorial and other interests that could not be dealt with by empowered and respected international institutions, this risk would be the main matter, and marginalization of nuclear weapons would indeed be in order. But we are not.

This means that nuclear weapons force the most powerful nations on earth to always consider peaceful alternatives to war because going to war is too dangerous for either side. This means possessing nuclear weapons deters war and so is moral.

**B. There is no alternative to nuclear weapons for making war obsolete.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Nuclear weapons are not all that is needed to make war obsolete, but they have no real substitute. Modern weapons such as those used in the Gulf War promise victory to the side that has them and leave the other side eager to build or buy them. Students of international politics have long noted this security dilemma: in the measure that a states's

search for security through conventional armaments and alliances is successful, it makes its neighbors and rivals insecure and leads to wars that may be disastrous for everyone.

To make things worse, unscrupulous politicians maintain themselves in power by preying on and exacerbating these longstanding fears among neighbors, as we now see tragically around the globe. Gulf War weaponry offers nothing new in this regard.

This means that there exists no alternative to nuclear weapons that could be successful in deterring war so if we affirm, increased war is inevitable meaning negating is the only moral option.

## Affirmative Extensions

**The possession of nuclear weapons can undermine the security of some states.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

There is a counter-argument. Both India and Pakistan are threshold nuclear-weapons states. Yet the knowledge of each other's capacity to deploy nuclear weapons within a very short period of felt need has not prevented a proxy war being waged in Kashmir since 1989. The total number of fatalities in that conflict is now around 20,000. By most common definitions in use among social scientists today, such as 1000 battle-related deaths per year, that is war. Moreover, as the figures above showed, this is the more common type of conflict situation today, not military battles across international frontiers. So we do have a major example of the failure of deterrence. And, following Karl Popper, just one example is sufficient to falsify the theory of deterrence.

**The possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily lead to prestige or influence.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

As for influence conferred by threshold nuclear-weapons status, consider this. India and Israel are threshold nuclear-weapons states but regional powers; Japan is a non-nuclear-weapons state but a world power; and nuclear brinkmanship wins North Korea neither friends nor prestige.

**There is sufficient doubt as to the morality and legality of nuclear weapons that the negative has a burden to demonstrate the possessing them is legal and moral.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Third, there are substantial legal and moral doubts and costs of nuclear-weapons capability and ambiguity. The stockpiling, threat and use of nuclear weapons cannot perhaps be proven to be immoral or illegal. But there are sufficient doubts about them for us to conclude that there is at least a case to be answered. The widely-held belief that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal led to the hearing at the World Court for an advisory opinion on the subject. The case to outlaw nuclear weapons begins with the analogy with the biological and chemical weapons conventions which have outlawed these two classes of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons, it is contended, are worse in the severity, scope and duration of their destructive effects. In a popular analogy, the situation is likened to making drugs illegal but exempting heroin from the ban. The UN General Assembly is the closest approximation that we have to the authentic conscience of humanity. For over three decades, a majority in the Assembly has pronounced the use of nuclear weapons to be a crime against humanity.

**The philosophy of nuclear deterrence violates the requirements of the Just War doctrine.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Nuclear deterrence cannot evade the requirements of just war doctrines. Thus deterrence, if it were to be legal, must satisfy the principle of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants. In violation of this principle, the 'balance of terror' rests fundamentally on threatening large-scale attacks on civilians. Second, deterrence must follow the rule of proportionality with respect to provocations and objectives. Targeting of 'military related' enemy industry and utilities would inflict death and misery on millions of enemy citizens as 'collateral' damage, and is therefore illegal on the just war doctrine.

**The use of nuclear weapons would violate the rights of neutral states.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

The use of nuclear weapons would also violate the rights of neutral states through the widespread dispersal of radioactive fallout. Most of the interest in the World Court's opinion has centred on the legality of nuclear weapons because of the unstoppable, unpredictable and indiscriminate health and environmental effects. Moreover, the toxic radioactive products of nuclear explosions affect the health of other species, and they would continue to do so well into dreamtime.

**Nuclear deterrence is equivalent to nuclear terrorism.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Deterrence based on hitting population centres ignores too the moral distinction between ends and means. The position seems analogous to terrorists taking innocent bystanders hostage as a means of protecting themselves against capture. We would rightly consider it immoral for the government to deter murder by threatening to kill any murderer's children. If this is not acceptable as proper public policy, why should nuclear deterrence be any more acceptable as proper foreign policy? Deterrence is nuclear terrorism by another name.

**The nuclear states must consider leading by example to end nuclear proliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

The five nuclear-weapons states must assess the security gains of their nuclear weapons against the costs, risks and alternatives. In particular, they must weigh the costs of the political chain reaction of nuclear-weapons status against the likelihood of the usability of nuclear weapons. The circuit-breaker in this countervailing nuclear-weapons capability spiral is the United States. Exhortation and coercion need to be supplemented by the force of example.

**Nuclear disarmament would help US prestige while continued possession undermines it.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

In a speech on 27 October 1995, CIA Director John M. Deutch noted that there are at least twenty countries trying to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. 'We want to understand what makes their intentions and motivations to be proliferators', he said.(2) The curt response is that he could begin by looking at the intentions and motivations of the United States in acquiring and wishing to keep nuclear weapons. By eliminating its stockpile of nuclear weapons, the United States would prove that national security and foreign policy independence can be preserved without nuclear weapons capability. Other nuclear-weapons states could then follow. Conversely, the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries would erode the US advantage as the world's dominant power, and multiply the number of potential trouble spots where the United States might be called upon to intervene. Or, in simple terms, where is the moral high ground when the United States with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads -- or even the UN Security Council with the nuclear-weapons states as the five permanent members -- demands of North Korea that it must not produce a single nuclear bomb?

**Nuclear disarmament would end fears of vertical and horizontal proliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

All of this can be avoided in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Those who do not have nuclear weapons would gain from the creation of a level security field and from the attenuation of worries about horizontal proliferation. The elimination of all nuclear weapons would not just lead to complete nuclear disarmament. It would also end fears of vertical proliferation among the nuclear-weapons states. And the same with horizontal proliferation.

**Nuclear disarmament would be conducive to peaceful global change.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

Moreover, nuclear-weapon-free policies can assist with the establishment of conditions that are more conducive to peaceful change than a world of nuclear weapons. For governments are more reluctant to withdraw support from a leadership that has lost domestic support totally but still controls nuclear weapons.

**Possession of nuclear weapons risks undermining nonproliferation gains.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

Seventh, the security calculus of nuclear-weapons-states should include the risk of a rollback of non-proliferation gains. We are at an interesting crossroads in the international strategic situation. The threat of nuclear war between Moscow and Washington has receded. In May 1995 the international community agreed to the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite many reservations, because of the demonstrable progress made in nuclear disarmament

negotiations. The resumption of nuclear testing by France, and continuation of the Chinese testing programme, brought charges of betrayal from many who had agreed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's indefinite extension in good faith.

**Disarmament is necessary to achieve nuclear nonproliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

In other words, the existing balance of nuclear-weapons status is a dynamic equilibrium, not a static equation. Without concrete disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapons states, the world will slip back into real dangers of horizontal proliferation. So the choice is between progress and reversal, not between progress and the status quo. 'Minimal deterrence' will not do. The possession of nuclear weapons by Israel and the United States did not deter Iraq from, but instead spurred it into, trying to acquire its own bomb by clandestine means. The two policy options, therefore, are a progression down to zero for the existing nuclear-weapons states, or the spread of nuclear weapons to many other states.

**Disarmament is crucial to ending nuclear proliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

The policy question for the United States is not, therefore, how to get India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rather, it is to try to understand the logic and politics of proliferation pressures, and then to encourage the forces resisting the calls for proliferation while dampening the opposite tendencies. In this equation, Washington simply stirs up anger and resentment by lecturing India while insisting on its own right to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely. The BJP spokesmen openly dismiss a world of 'nuclear apartheid'. However ill-applied the pejorative label might be in logic, it is politically unanswerable and therefore very effective. If, on the other hand, the five nuclear-weapons states were to announce that they had worked out a fixed timetable for the dismantling of their own nuclear stockpiles, then the balance of political pressures in India would swing decisively away from proliferation.

**We must disarm now.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Eighth, there is the need to seize the moment now. The reason to move now towards a nuclear-free world is that the lead-time in reaching that distant goal will be long. The threats of proliferation will multiply from this point on. The Non-Proliferation Treaty having been indefinitely extended, the momentum on arms control and disarmament must not be allowed to flag. Instead, it must be taken advantage of in pressing for still further progress on nuclear disarmament.

**Disarmament is crucial to Western hegemony.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

This is also the period in history characterised by the dominant influence of the major Western powers. Unlikely to remain a permanent feature of international relations, this gives them the opportunity to lead by example as well as through exhortation, persuasion and pressure, while incurring no security risks of any magnitude. The United States is unique in possessing all the bases of power: abundant natural resources, a huge and dynamic market economy and high technology. It has also been well placed in the 1990s as never before to reap the benefits of its soft power resources: the wide appeal of its society and way of life, and the supremacy of its liberal internationalist ideology in such major institutions as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Nuclear weapons are the great strategic equalisers. Ridding the world of nuclear weapons will lock in the superiority of the Western powers, yet not cut into any of the identifiable security interests of Russia, China or any other nuclear-weapons states. This exceptional strategic correlation of circumstances will not last forever.

**We must seek security from nuclear weapons, not with nuclear weapons.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

We should seek security from, not in, nuclear weapons. The nuclear security dilemma is this. The nuclear-weapons states will not give up their nuclear capability without first being convinced that their strategic dominance will not be challenged. But the threshold nuclear-weapons states will not give up their nuclear option without seeing proof of a timetabled move towards a nuclear-free world. The road towards the nuclear-free destination includes still deeper reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear-weapons states; further constraints on the deployment of their nuclear weapons on the territories of other states, for example by means of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the negotiation of a ban on missile test flights and on the production of fissile materials; and so on. International agreement will be much easier to achieve on a zero than on a low-limit nuclear weapons regime. An agreement which freezes the right of the existing nuclear-weapons states to retain their nuclear-weapons capability indefinitely is simply not politically sustainable. Verification of zero nuclear weapons will also be easier than of low limits on their numbers.

**Affirming is the only guarantee of ensuring there is no nuclear war.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

The only guarantee against the threat of nuclear war is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They are the common enemy of mankind. Like chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons too cannot be disinvented. (Chemical weapons are probably easier to reinvent, given how commonly used their ingredients are around the house.) But like them, nuclear weapons too can be outlawed under an international regime that ensures strict compliance through effective and credible inspection, verification and control regimes. In most contexts, a step-by-step approach is the best policy. But such caution can be fatal if the need is to

cross a chasm. In the case of nuclear weapons, the chasm that needs to be leaped across is the mental conditioning of national and world security resting on weapons of maximum insecurity.

**Possession of nuclear weapons is leading to a renewed arms race.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

U.S. determination to maintain nuclear weapons in the 21st century led Russian President Vladimir Putin to announce in 2004 that Russia is "carrying out research and missile tests of state-of-the-art nuclear missile systems." Russia, he said, would "continue to build up firmly and insistently our armed forces, including the nuclear component." The U.K. is replacing its aging submarine-launched Trident nuclear missiles. France and China refuse to be left behind in this new nuclear arms race.

**As long as any nation possesses nuclear weapons, other nations will want them.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

While political and media attention has been focused on Iran and North Korea for their nuclear technology developments, little attention is paid to the heart of the nuclear weapons problem: the refusal of the major powers to negotiate the elimination of their own nuclear weapons while proscribing acquisition by any other state. Brazil put the issue tartly: "One cannot worship at the altar of nuclear weapons and raise heresy charges against those who want to join the sect." The report from the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, an international nongovernmental organization, warns that as long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. And as long as any such weapons remain in any state's arsenal, "there is as high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic."

**Even a limited nuclear engagement would have devastating impacts for the planet.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, recently published the results of research showing that even a "limited" nuclear war would damage the earth's climate in profound, long-lasting ways. Sudden and persistent global cooling would lead to crop failures and massive famine and epidemics of infectious diseases. These findings are derived from regional nuclear war scenarios that are easy to envision as nuclear weapons start to spread to additional countries.

**The world is sleepwalking toward nuclear catastrophe.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

THE POSSIBILITY OF economic collapse and nuclear-war-induced famine from even a small exchange of nuclear weapons should be a wakeup call to governments. However, the 2005 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty--the largest multilateral arms control treaty in the world--ended in failure. The Bush administration rejected any references to the "unequivocal undertaking" to total nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear weapons states at previous NPT reviews in 1995 and 2000. Iran and Egypt, in turn, blocked proposals to strengthen the treaty to ensure that access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes would not lead to the capacity for bomb-making. This intransigence led Kofi Annan, then U.N. Secretary-General, to warn that the world is "sleepwalking" toward a nuclear catastrophe.

**The risk of nuclear accidents cannot be denied.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

The nuclear weapons states like to brag about their reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and the safety of their security systems. But with the U.S. and Russia maintaining at least a total of 2,500 nuclear weapons on "high alert" status--meaning they could be fired on 15 minutes' notice--the danger of malfunction or a decision made in panic cannot be denied. The nuclear weapons states play a game of "disarmament" in which weapons reductions are only a cover for modernization programs that ensure nuclear weapons will be held well into the second half of the 21st century.

**The US bears special responsibility for imperiling the globe with nuclear weapons.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

While all nuclear weapons states must bear their share of the responsibility for imperiling global security, the United States, by far the most militarily powerful country in the world, bears a special responsibility. The U.S. accounts for almost half of all world military expenditures and spends \$110 million a day on its nuclear forces. The Union of Concerned Scientists--a group not given to hyperbole--says, "Current U.S. nuclear weapons policy is outdated, dangerous, and misguided." Former President Jimmy Carter, writing of the Carter Center's work in monitoring compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, says, "We ... strongly condemn the recent abandonment by the United States of those agreements previously negotiated and its failure to pursue other restraints."

**Possession of nuclear weapons violates internationally accepted ethics.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

All major religions teach a culture of peace (see "A Crime Against God and Humanity," page 30). Do not do unto others what you do not want done to you--this Golden Rule, or the ethic of reciprocity, is found in the scriptures of nearly every religion and is often regarded as the most concise and general principle of ethics. The insinuation of nuclear weapons into permanent military doctrines directly counters this ethic. Moreover, incorporating into ongoing public policies weapons whose chief characteristic is to kill massively violates the universality of human rights.

**Nuclear weapons are uniquely, and horrifyingly, destructive.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

Since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 seems so long ago, and new generations have grown up without a vivid reminder of what nuclear weapons do, the horror of these weapons needs to be recalled. Nuclear weapons are not just an advanced form of weaponry: They have the power to decimate the natural environment that has sustained humanity since the beginning of time. Nuclear weapons, in addition to causing massive death and destruction, induce cancers and congenital deformities and result in health-related problems for decades.

## Negative Extensions

### **Nuclear weapons have had a stabilizing impact upon super power relations.**

Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," Western States Legal Foundation, June 27, 2000

Nuclear weapons played a pivotal role in international security during the latter half of the twentieth century. Despite rapid increases in communications, transportation, and weapons technology, there has been no large-scale strategic conflict since the Second World War. Nuclear weapons, as the most destructive instruments ever invented, had a stabilizing effect on superpower relations by making any conflict unacceptably costly. However, geopolitical change and the evolution of military technology suggest that the composition of our nuclear forces and our strategy for their employment may be different in the twenty-first century. The time is right for a fundamental rethinking of our expectations and requirements for these unique weapons.

### **Nuclear weapons assure the US of retaliatory capacity.**

Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," Western States Legal Foundation, June 27, 2000

Even with the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world during the past decade, nuclear warplanning today is similar in many respects to what it was during the Cold War. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is focused on a massive counterattack strategy that aims to eliminate the ability of an adversary to inflict further damage to American interests. Nuclear weapons provide an assured retaliatory capability to convince any adversary that aggression or coercion would be met with a response that would be certain, overwhelming, and devastating. It is often, but not universally, thought that nuclear weapons would be used only in extremis, when the nation is in the gravest danger. While there has been some discussion of "single weapon" strikes against isolated targets, such as sites of weapons of mass destruction, most of the attention in nuclear strategy has been and is directed toward large-scale engagements. This may not be true in the future.

### **Nuclear weapons can be changed to meet the needs of the modern military.**

Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," Western States Legal Foundation, June 27, 2000

The role of nuclear weaponry as the ultimate deterrent to aggression and the ultimate destructive force in combat will likely lead to the retention of at least some nuclear forces for decades to come. However, the composition of our nuclear arsenal may undergo significant modification to respond to changing conditions, changing military needs, and changes in our confidence in our ability to maintain credible nuclear forces without nuclear testing or large-scale weapons production. Options for precision delivery of nuclear weapons may reduce the requirement for high yield. Lower yield weapons could be produced as modifications of existing weapons designs, or they could employ more rugged and simpler designs that might be developed and maintained with high confidence without nuclear testing and with a smaller nuclear weapons complex than we envision is required to maintain our current nuclear forces.

**Nuclear weapons are used every day to deter.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

"Nuclear weapons are used every day." So says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's explaining -- concepts that were seemingly ignored in this week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on to explain, "to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection."

**Advocacy of disarmament is not based on reality.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

But above all, Mr. Schlesinger is a nuclear realist. Are we heading toward a nuclear-free world anytime soon? He shoots back a one-word answer: "No." I keep silent, hoping he will go on. "We will need a strong deterrent," he finally says, "and that is measured at least in decades -- in my judgment, in fact, more or less in perpetuity. The notion that we can abolish nuclear weapons reflects on a combination of American utopianism and American parochialism. . . . It's like the [1929] Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy . . . . It's not based upon an understanding of reality."

**Affirming would make the US more vulnerable.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

In other words: Go ahead and wish for a nuclear-free world, but pray that you don't get what you wish for. A world without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with them, Mr. Schlesinger argues. "If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear weapons," he says, "what we would have is a number of countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors of breakout capabilities -- for intimidation purposes. . . . and finally, probably, a number of small clandestine stockpiles." This would make the U.S. more vulnerable.

**The US still needs nuclear weapons to deter state actors.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

Mr. Schlesinger makes the case for a strong U.S. deterrent. Yes, the Cold War has ended and, yes, while "we worry about Russia's nuclear posture to some degree, it is not just as prominent as it once was." The U.S. still needs to deter Russia, which has the largest nuclear capability of any potential adversary, and the Chinese, who have a modest (and growing) capability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has no influence on North Korea or Iran, he says, or on nonstate actors.

"They're not going to be deterred by the possibility of a nuclear response to actions that they might take," he says.

**The US needs nuclear weapons to protect its allies.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

There's another compelling reason for a strong U.S. deterrent: the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which protects more than 30 allies world-wide. "If we were only protecting the North American continent," he says, "we could do so with far fewer weapons than we have at present in the stockpile." But a principal aim of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is "to provide the necessary reassurance to our allies, both in Asia and in Europe." That includes "our new NATO allies such as Poland and the Baltic States," which, he notes dryly, continue to be concerned about their Russian neighbor. "Indeed, they inform us regularly that they understand the Russians far better than do we."

**Some expansion of nuclear capacity to other nations may be necessary.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

The congressional commission warned of a coming "tipping point" in proliferation, when more nations might decide to go nuclear if they were to lose confidence in the U.S. deterrent, or in Washington's will to use it. If U.S. allies lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them, they'll kick off a new nuclear arms race. That's a reason Mr. Schlesinger wants to bring Japan into the nuclear conversation. "One of the recommendations of the commission is that we start to have a dialogue with the Japanese about strategic capabilities in order both to help enlighten them and to provide reassurance that they will be protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In the past, that has not been the case. Japan never was seriously threatened by Soviet capabilities and that the Soviets looked westward largely is a threat against Western Europe. But now that the Chinese forces have been growing into the many hundreds of weapons, we think that it's necessary to talk to the Japanese in the same way that we have talked to the Europeans over the years." He reminds me of the comment of Japanese political leader Ichiro Ozawa, who said in 2002 that it would be "easy" for Japan to make nuclear warheads and that it had enough plutonium to make several thousand weapons. "When one contemplates a number like that," Mr. Schlesinger says, "one sees that a substantial role in nonproliferation has been the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without that, some and perhaps a fair number of our allies would feel the necessity of having their own nuclear capabilities."

**The US needs to upgrade its nuclear weapons, not disarm.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

The U.S. is the only major nuclear power that is not modernizing its weapons. "The Russians have a shelf life for their weapons of about 10 years so they are continually replacing" them. The British and the French "stay up to date." And the Chinese and the Indians "continue to add to their stockpiles." But in the U.S., Congress won't even so much as fund R&D for the Reliable

Replacement Warhead. "The RRW has become a toxic term on Capitol Hill," Mr. Schlesinger says. Give it a new name, he seems to be suggesting, and try again to get Congress to fund it. "We need to be much more vigorous about life-extension programs" for the weapons.

**Disarmament would be counterproductive.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

We agree that the strongest possible measures must be taken to inhibit the acquisition of and roll back the possession of nuclear weapons. However, the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive. It will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.

**The US disarming will have no effect on states seeking nuclear capacity.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

A nation that wishes to acquire nuclear weapons believes these weapons will improve its security. The declaration by the U.S. that it will move to eliminate nuclear weapons in a distant future will have no direct effect on changing this calculus. Indeed, nothing that the U.S. does to its nuclear posture will directly influence such a nation's (let alone a terrorist group's) calculus. Whatever their other merits (and they are significant), it is difficult to argue that a comprehensive test ban treaty, a "no first use" declaration by the U.S., a dramatic reduction in the number of deployed or total nuclear weapons in our stockpile, an end to the production of fissionable material will convince North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan or Israel to give up their nuclear weapons programs.

**We cannot realistically prevent proliferating states from acquiring nuclear weapons.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

No one suggests abandoning the hope embodied in such a well-intentioned statement. However, hope is not a policy, and, at present, there is no realistic path to a world free of nuclear weapons. One cannot, for example, make the scientific knowledge and technological know-how that make nuclear weapons possible disappear. Proliferating states, even if they abandoned these devices under resolute international pressure, would still be able to clandestinely retain a few of their existing weapons -- or maintain a standby, break-out capability to acquire a few weapons quickly, if needed.

**The US must retain its nuclear capacity because as long as its conventional military is strong, states will seek nuclear weapons.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

So long as serious political differences exist between nations and peoples, and given that the possibility of nuclear weapons exists, the U.S. should have nuclear weapons to deter potential opponents and to avoid intimidation by other states seeking a capability of weapons of mass destruction. In any case, even in the absence of overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, the great predominance of U.S. conventional forces would remain a strong motive for aspiring states to seek nuclear weapons.

**Discouraging proliferation is possible in a world with nuclear weapons.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

It is possible to slow the spread of nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina were convinced to abandon their weapons programs. In the 1990s, South Africa voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons after apartheid. During the first Clinton administration, the U.S. successfully persuaded governments of the former Soviet Union to transfer their nuclear weapons to the new Russian state. During the present Bush administration, Libya renounced its nuclear program. In each case, these successes came about by the combined application of the carrots and sticks of proliferation policy, and a change in the way a proliferating state perceived its security circumstances.

**Non proliferation can be encouraged simply by nuclear reduction.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

Given its predominant conventional weapons capability, the U.S. can safely reduce the total inventory of nuclear weapons to the lowest number needed for the purpose of deterrence. This number is likely to be considerably below the present stockpile of over 8,000 weapons. This reduction will harmonize nuclear weapons policy with our attempt to encourage nonproliferation elsewhere. Meanwhile, the U.S. should not propose or fund large-scale programs or initiatives that suggest new roles for nuclear weapons.

**A nuclear free world is not necessary to pursue laudable non proliferation goals.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

There are several critical nonproliferation objectives that should be pursued, but they do not require any unattainable vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world to justify them. Supplier states, for one, should seek to control the transfer of fissile material and relevant technology, using the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Second: Building on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program, greater emphasis needs to be given to security of weapons and weapons-usable material, and not just in Russia. Third: Given the potential expansion of nuclear power

around the world, it is urgent to put into place new means for controlling the aspects of the fuel cycle -- enrichment and fuel reprocessing -- that present the greatest proliferation risk.

**Economic incentives can be used to discourage proliferation.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

Finally, the most important and difficult task is to change the underlying security circumstances that lead nations to seek nuclear weapons. To that end, direct negotiations involving positive incentives (economic, political and security arrangements) for states willing to abandon nuclear weapons aspirations, as well as cooperation with others to impose negative sanctions across an escalating spectrum on recalcitrant actors, are essential. These are concrete actions, analogous to the Marshall Plan, to take a historical example, not mere gestures like the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928, which "outlawed war."

**US foreign policy must be based on the reality that nuclear deterrence is necessary.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated. Foreign policy must be based on this reality; and the U.S. should work with other nations on those achievable objectives that lower the risks of the spread of nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of nuclear weapons use.

**Nuclear weapons secure US interests abroad without the need for war.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Contrary to what many wish, the states of the world are not becoming law-abiding citizens of one world, at least not in essential security matters. In such matters, the United States, as do other states, relies ultimately on its own forces, for the good and sufficient reason that there is nothing else reliable around. As a result, traditional security-oriented behavior abounds today. What is going on in Central Europe, in East Asia, in the Middle East would be familiar to Metternich and Bismarck. This is not to deny that our world is in many respects different from theirs, in particular that it is interactive, reactive, and interdependent as never before. But it is insecure now in much the ways it was then. And now, as then, having the most powerful weapons and deterrent plays an essential role in attaining the number one security policy objective of the United States, which is to preserve our central interests abroad without involving us in war.

**Nuclear weapons make war obsolete by destroying the territory the nations are fighting over.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Nuclear weapons do something different. They cheaply and predictably destroy whatever both sides are fighting for. It is just that ability to destroy the battlefield as well as the enemy, to leave war without winners, that makes them essential. Abolitionists and marginalizers have nothing realistic to offer to replace them in that role.

**The notion that war is obsolete among major powers because of economic interdependency is flawed.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

The world balance of military power (a consequence, among other things, of the balance of economic power), is changing and will continue to change. Reasonably or not, that makes other powers insecure. World War I and World War II were the way the major and most civilized powers in the world handled the changing balance of power occasioned by the growth of Germany and Japan in relation to the others. It need not have happened that way. It shouldn't have happened that way. As early as 1913, thoughtful people pointed out that Europe was so interdependent economically that war would destroy it and that war was therefore obsolete. They were right about the first observation and wrong about the second.

**There is not international policing power that can deter war like nuclear weapons can.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

The answers are the stuff of international relations libraries, but at the very heart is the security dilemma noted above: so long as security depends ultimately on rival goods, goods that have to be competed for, such as territory, alliances, access to scarce resources, then more security for one state will mean ultimately less for the other. Maintaining a peaceful balance would be to everyone's advantage, at least for advanced nations no longer bent on acquiring virgin lands for plunder. But that makes peace a public good. Like all public goods, it requires an agreed-on authority able to coerce rebels and free-riders into supporting it if it is to be provided. Reason alone has never been enough: to be the last state to defect is just too dangerous. There was no such authority earlier this century. Is there one today? The United Nations Security Council? The International Court of Justice? Maybe someday, but not this century or perhaps the next. When have we or any other major nation submitted to these institutions when our central, or sometimes even our peripheral, interests were involved?

**Major world powers settle disputes peacefully because of nuclear weapons.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

What we are seeing instead is the major powers of the world, the United States, Russia, China, Japan, the European Union, mixing universalist global or regional initiatives with the carving out of spheres of influence in much the same way their predecessors on the world stage did. Spheres of influence no longer involve gunboats and marching armies most of the time - though sometimes they still do. Usually they involve such things as supplier-client relationships in arms and nuclear fuel, alliances and stationing of troops abroad, rule-writing in international agreements, and support in negotiations with rival powers. The major security questions of the day are all handled with considerable attention to this traditional concern: the expansion of NATO; the tip-toeing around Serb aggression; Russia's policy in its "near-abroad," a balance of power term if ever there was one; China's policy in the South China Sea; continuing U.S. willingness to pay with blood and money to keep its suzerainty over Latin America and the Gulf States; China's blocking of UN sanctions in North Korea, sanctions that would have increased U.S. influence on the peninsula and decreased the value of Chinese security guarantees; Russia's and China's offer of nuclear help to Iran. Even nuclear nonproliferation policies, which contain an element of universalist values, reflect this attempt to acquire or augment spheres of influence. How explain otherwise China's relative unconcern about a nuclear North Korea or Russia's about a nuclear Iran? Nuclear weapons in the hands of these countries would mainly limit U.S. power projections in the area, which necessarily depend on such concentrated and therefore vulnerable military assets as air bases, ports, and aircraft carriers. They would do relatively little to limit the influence of the big near-neighbors.

**Nuclear weapons have a profound effect on state security.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Nuclear weapons do not of themselves create the authority to provide and maintain peace, but they impose a penalty, obvious to all, not least to volatile democratic electorates, for overlooking this truth. Thereby, they have and will continue to have a profound influence on our security. They will do so in at least two ways: they will continue to put a considerable premium on caution when one nuclear state deals with another in matters either or both consider central, and, partly as a result, they will continue to tend to freeze lines of demarcations between spheres of influence where these lines matter to either or both of the contending major states.

## Blocks

### Affirmative Blocks

Affirmative answers to (A/T) common negative arguments

A/T Nuclear weapons successful deter military action.

**1. The threat of nuclear weapons is irrelevant in most modern conflicts.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Nuclear weapons are of limited utility in the types of conflicts engaging our attention today. Wallensteen and Sollenberg have counted a total of 94 armed conflicts during the six-year period 1989-94 inclusive.(1) Of these, only four were inter-state. The majority of the internal conflicts were over government (civil wars) or territory (state formation). Of the 42 armed conflicts in existence in 1994, 25 were major (defined as having recorded over 1000 battle-related deaths) and 17 minor (defined as having recorded at least 25 battle-related deaths in one year but under 1000 during the course of the conflict). Only seven of the 42 armed conflicts were wars (where battle-related deaths exceed 1000 in one year). Thus wars, defined in relation to battlefield casualties whether between or within states, are the exception, and armed conflicts are the norm. The threat or use of nuclear weapons is simply irrelevant in such conflicts.

**2. The Cold War strategy of MAD is now obsolete.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

The mutual deterrence structure of the Cold War period is now obsolete. The idea of any one of the United States, Russia or China launching a nuclear strike against any one of the others seems too fantastic to be credible. For the next decade or generation, nuclear weapons will have a lesser effect on shaping the nature of relations between Moscow and Washington than at any time since the Second World War. Nor do nuclear weapons have any relevance to a European war. And when we add up all the forms of security assurances from the nuclear-weapons states, including those issued to the 180 plus countries that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then the use of nuclear weapons is excluded from virtually all regions of the world already. That is, nuclear weapons need not presently be part of the basic national security doctrine of the nuclear-weapons states. Their elimination would not create a void that would have to be filled by other means.

**3. The possession of nuclear weapons has failed as deterrence between nuclear enemies.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

There is a counter-argument. Both India and Pakistan are threshold nuclear-weapons states. Yet the knowledge of each other's capacity to deploy nuclear weapons within a very short period of felt need has not prevented a proxy war being waged in Kashmir since 1989. The total number of fatalities in that conflict is now around 20,000. By most common definitions in use among social scientists today, such as 1000 battle-related deaths per year, that is war. Moreover, as the figures above showed, this is the more common type of conflict situation today, not military battles across international frontiers. So we do have a major example of the failure of deterrence. And, following Karl Popper, just one example is sufficient to falsify the theory of deterrence.

A/T Disarming would leave the US vulnerable.

**1. Nuclear disarmament would help US prestige while continued possession undermines it.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

In a speech on 27 October 1995, CIA Director John M. Deutch noted that there are at least twenty countries trying to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. 'We want to understand what makes their intentions and motivations to be proliferators', he said.(2) The curt response is that he could begin by looking at the intentions and motivations of the United States in acquiring and wishing to keep nuclear weapons. By eliminating its stockpile of nuclear weapons, the United States would prove that national security and foreign policy independence can be preserved without nuclear weapons capability. Other nuclear-weapons states could then follow. Conversely, the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries would erode the US advantage as the world's dominant power, and multiply the number of potential trouble spots where the United States might be called upon to intervene. Or, in simple terms, where is the moral high ground when the United States with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads -- or even the UN Security Council with the nuclear-weapons states as the five permanent members -- demands of North Korea that it must not produce a single nuclear bomb?

**2. Nuclear disarmament would end fears of vertical and horizontal proliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

All of this can be avoided in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Those who do not have nuclear weapons would gain from the creation of a level security field and from the attenuation of worries about horizontal proliferation. The elimination of all nuclear weapons would not just lead to complete nuclear disarmament. It would also end fears of vertical proliferation among the nuclear-weapons states. And the same with horizontal proliferation.

**3. Disarmament is crucial to Western hegemony.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

This is also the period in history characterised by the dominant influence of the major Western powers. Unlikely to remain a permanent feature of international relations, this gives them the opportunity to lead by example as well as through exhortation, persuasion and pressure, while incurring no security risks of any magnitude. The United States is unique in possessing all the bases of power: abundant natural resources, a huge and dynamic market economy and high technology. It has also been well placed in the 1990s as never before to reap the benefits of its soft power resources: the wide appeal of its society and way of life, and the supremacy of its liberal internationalist ideology in such major institutions as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Nuclear weapons are the great strategic equalisers. Ridding the world of nuclear weapons will lock in the superiority of the Western powers, yet not cut into any of the identifiable security interests of Russia, China or any other nuclear-weapons states. This exceptional strategic correlation of circumstances will not last forever.

A/T Nuclear weapons assure the US can retaliate.

**1. Affirming is the only guarantee of ensuring there is no nuclear war which outweighs.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

The only guarantee against the threat of nuclear war is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They are the common enemy of mankind. Like chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons too cannot be disinvented. (Chemical weapons are probably easier to reinvent, given how commonly used their ingredients are around the house.) But like them, nuclear weapons too can be outlawed under an international regime that ensures strict compliance through effective and credible inspection, verification and control regimes. In most contexts, a step-by-step approach is the best policy. But such caution can be fatal if the need is to cross a chasm. In the case of nuclear weapons, the chasm that needs to be leaped across is the mental conditioning of national and world security resting on weapons of maximum insecurity.

**2. Even a limited nuclear engagement would have devastating impacts for the planet which outweighs.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, recently published the results of research showing that even a "limited" nuclear war would damage the earth's climate in profound, long-lasting ways. Sudden and persistent global cooling would lead to crop failures and massive famine and epidemics of infectious diseases. These findings are derived from regional nuclear war scenarios that are easy to envision as nuclear weapons start to spread to additional countries.

**3. Recent history has demonstrated the effectiveness of conventional weapons in modern warfare so nuclear weapons are not necessary.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

Nuclear weapons were as unusable for the United States in Vietnam as for the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The one type of armament that has been quite superfluous to either fighting or managing the conflict in Bosnia is nuclear weapons. They are of no utility to India in dealing with its myriad of enduring low-intensity insurgencies. Conversely, the Gulf War showed that a massive response with sophisticated conventional weapons can suffice even against a latent, implicit or nascent threat of chemical and biological weapons.

**4. Retaliation is pointless if the US were destroyed by nuclear weapons so retaliation amounts to little more than senseless killing.**

A/T The US can stop proliferation while maintaining its nuclear arsenal.

**1. Nuclear disarmament would end fears of vertical and horizontal proliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

All of this can be avoided in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Those who do not have nuclear weapons would gain from the creation of a level security field and from the attenuation of worries about horizontal proliferation. The elimination of all nuclear weapons would not just lead to complete nuclear disarmament. It would also end fears of vertical proliferation among the nuclear-weapons states. And the same with horizontal proliferation.

**2. Possession of nuclear weapons risks undermining nonproliferation gains.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

Seventh, the security calculus of nuclear-weapons-states should include the risk of a rollback of non-proliferation gains. We are at an interesting crossroads in the international strategic situation. The threat of nuclear war between Moscow and Washington has receded. In May 1995 the international community agreed to the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite many reservations, because of the demonstrable progress made in nuclear disarmament negotiations. The resumption of nuclear testing by France, and continuation of the Chinese testing programme, brought charges of betrayal from many who had agreed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's indefinite extension in good faith.

**3. Disarmament is necessary to achieve nuclear nonproliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

In other words, the existing balance of nuclear-weapons status is a dynamic equilibrium, not a static equation. Without concrete disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapons states, the world will slip back into real dangers of horizontal proliferation. So the choice is between progress and reversal, not between progress and the status quo. 'Minimal deterrence' will not do. The possession of nuclear weapons by Israel and the United States did not deter Iraq from, but instead spurred it into, trying to acquire its own bomb by clandestine means. The two policy options, therefore, are a progression down to zero for the existing nuclear-weapons states, or the spread of nuclear weapons to many other states.

**4. Disarmament is crucial to ending nuclear proliferation.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," New Zealand International Review, Vol. 22, 1997

However ill-applied the pejorative label might be in logic, it is politically unanswerable and therefore very effective. If, on the other hand, the five nuclear-weapons states were to announce that they had worked out a fixed time-table for the dismantling of their own nuclear stockpiles, then the balance of political pressures in India would swing decisively away from proliferation.

A/T Nuclear weapons no longer represent the threat they once did.

**1. Nuclear weapons are uniquely, and horrifyingly, destructive so they are a threat.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

Since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 seems so long ago, and new generations have grown up without a vivid reminder of what nuclear weapons do, the horror of these weapons needs to be recalled. Nuclear weapons are not just an advanced form of weaponry: They have the power to decimate the natural environment that has sustained humanity since the beginning of time. Nuclear weapons, in addition to causing massive death and destruction, induce cancers and congenital deformities and result in health-related problems for decades.

**2. The risk of nuclear accidents cannot be denied meaning they still threaten masses of people.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

The nuclear weapons states like to brag about their reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and the safety of their security systems. But with the U.S. and Russia maintaining at least a total of 2,500 nuclear weapons on "high alert" status--meaning they could be fired on 15 minutes' notice--the danger of malfunction or a decision made in panic cannot be denied. The nuclear weapons states play a game of "disarmament" in which weapons reductions are only a cover for modernization programs that ensure nuclear weapons will be held well into the second half of the 21st century.

**3. This idea is why the world is sleepwalking toward nuclear catastrophe.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," Sojourners Magazine, Vol. 37, March 2008

THE POSSIBILITY OF economic collapse and nuclear-war-induced famine from even a small exchange of nuclear weapons should be a wakeup call to governments. However, the 2005 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty--the largest multilateral arms control treaty in the world--ended in failure. The Bush administration rejected any references to the "unequivocal undertaking" to total nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear weapons states at previous NPT reviews in 1995 and 2000. Iran and Egypt, in turn, blocked proposals to strengthen the treaty to ensure that access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes would not lead to the capacity for bomb-making. This intransigence led Kofi Annan, then U.N. Secretary-General, to warn that the world is "sleepwalking" toward a nuclear catastrophe.

A/T Planning to do the immoral can be moral.

**1. The philosophy of nuclear deterrence violates the requirements of the Just War doctrine.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Nuclear deterrence cannot evade the requirements of just war doctrines. Thus deterrence, if it were to be legal, must satisfy the principle of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants. In violation of this principle, the 'balance of terror' rests fundamentally on threatening large-scale attacks on civilians. Second, deterrence must follow the rule of proportionality with respect to provocations and objectives. Targeting of 'military related' enemy industry and utilities would inflict death and misery on millions of enemy citizens as 'collateral' damage, and is therefore illegal on the just war doctrine.

**2. Nuclear deterrence is equivalent to nuclear terrorism which is immoral.**

Ramesh Thakur, "Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 22, 1997

Deterrence based on hitting population centres ignores too the moral distinction between ends and means. The position seems analogous to terrorists taking innocent bystanders hostage as a means of protecting themselves against capture. We would rightly consider it immoral for the government to deter murder by threatening to kill any murderer's children. If this is not acceptable as proper public policy, why should nuclear deterrence be any more acceptable as proper foreign policy? Deterrence is nuclear terrorism by another name.

**3. Possession of nuclear weapons violates internationally accepted ethics and so cannot be moral.**

Douglas Roche, "Sleepwalking in a Nuclear Minefield: The United States Still Worships at the Altar of Nuclear Weapons-Yet Cries 'Heresy' When Others Want to Join the Sect," *Sojourners Magazine*, Vol. 37, March 2008

All major religions teach a culture of peace (see "A Crime Against God and Humanity," page 30). Do not do unto others what you do not want done to you--this Golden Rule, or the ethic of reciprocity, is found in the scriptures of nearly every religion and is often regarded as the most concise and general principle of ethics. The insinuation of nuclear weapons into permanent military doctrines directly counters this ethic. Moreover, incorporating into ongoing public policies weapons whose chief characteristic is to kill massively violates the universality of human rights.

## Negative Blocks

Negative answers to (A/T) common affirmative arguments

A/T Nuclear weapons have limited utility.

**1. Nuclear weapons are used every day to deter.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

"Nuclear weapons are used every day." So says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's explaining -- concepts that were seemingly ignored in this week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on to explain, "to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection."

**2. Nuclear weapons can be changed to meet the needs of the modern military.**

Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," Western States Legal Foundation, June 27, 2000

The role of nuclear weaponry as the ultimate deterrent to aggression and the ultimate destructive force in combat will likely lead to the retention of at least some nuclear forces for decades to come. However, the composition of our nuclear arsenal may undergo significant modification to respond to changing conditions, changing military needs, and changes in our confidence in our ability to maintain credible nuclear forces without nuclear testing or large-scale weapons production. Options for precision delivery of nuclear weapons may reduce the requirement for high yield. Lower yield weapons could be produced as modifications of existing weapons designs, or they could employ more rugged and simpler designs that might be developed and maintained with high confidence without nuclear testing and with a smaller nuclear weapons complex than we envision is required to maintain our current nuclear forces.

**3. The US needs nuclear weapons to protect its allies.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

There's another compelling reason for a strong U.S. deterrent: the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which protects more than 30 allies world-wide. "If we were only protecting the North American continent," he says, "we could do so with far fewer weapons than we have at present in the stockpile." But a principal aim of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is "to provide the necessary reassurance to our allies, both in Asia and in Europe." That includes "our new NATO allies such as Poland and the Baltic States," which, he notes dryly, continue to be concerned about their Russian neighbor. "Indeed, they inform us regularly that they understand the Russians far better than do we."

A/T Intention to do the immoral is itself, immoral.

**1. Planning to do the immoral can, indeed, be moral.**

Michael Levin, "Philosophers Discover the Bomb," National Review, Vol. 39, December 4, 1987

The great question in strategic policy is ultimately practical: how can we keep from becoming either red or dead? Thus, coming up with the right defense strategy involves knowing a great many facts and very little specialized philosophy. But nuclear ethicists plunge ahead, dressing up naked political opinions in philosophic garb. Nuclear weapons do pose a few intellectually intriguing puzzles and Gregory Kavka probed one of these in "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence," virtually the only interesting paper in the entire "nuclear ethics" canon. In promising to destroy the USSR should it attack us, the U.S. threatens to do something that would be pointless should the Soviets actually attack. Yet the threat itself is far from pointless, because it deters a Soviet attack. Thus, planning to do something wrong can itself be right if the act of planning has independent beneficial results--contrary to the common-sense assumption that the morality of intentions is to be evaluated solely by reference to what is intended.

**2. Disarmament would be a dangerous mistake meaning disarming is planning to do the immoral.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Thus, not only is abolition impossible under present circumstances, it would be a mistake even if it were possible. And marginalization is meaningless: nuclear weapons do not and should not enter daily calculations but do and should enter calculations of ultimate security. Deterrence was far stronger and more stable in the last 50 years than most lay commentators thought. Perversely, perhaps because it worked so well, many are now willing to give it up. But people should not give up fire insurance because fires have been rare, although it is reasonable to look for lower premiums and to work on less risky means of fire containment. We don't, however, have these less risky means. Winston Churchill is not particularly in favor these days. But Churchill, whatever his failings, understood what led to war. He warned at the beginning of the atomic age that safety could be the sturdy child of terror, and that we should not give up atomic weapons until we were sure and doubly sure that we had something better to take the place of terror in that respect. Look around: we have nothing better to take its place.

**3. Nuclear weapons make war obsolete by destroying the territory the nations are fighting over meaning intent behind them is to morally keep the peace.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Nuclear weapons do something different. They cheaply and predictably destroy whatever both sides are fighting for. It is just that ability to destroy the battlefield as well as the enemy, to leave war without winners, that makes them essential. Abolitionists and marginalizers have nothing realistic to offer to replace them in that role.

A/T Nuclear weapons create an immoral risk of destruction.

**1. The fact that possession of nuclear weapons inherently creates risk is insufficient to morally condemn them.**

Michael Levin, "Philosophers Discover the Bomb," National Review, Vol. 39, December 4, 1987

A SECOND ISSUE with some philosophic substance that nuclear ethicists discuss is the concept of risk. Douglas Lackey, one of the most prolific writers on nuclear ethics, notes that mere possession of nuclear weapons creates risk, and there is a presumption against creating risk. If you have nuclear weapons, you may decide to use them, or perhaps they could go off by accident. (It is invariably American weapons that create these dilemmas; Soviet weapons are always blameless responses to American aggressiveness.) What Lackey's truism does not tell us, of course, is how to distinguish between permissible and impermissible risks. Life is dangerous, and society is frequently forced to evaluate levels of risk. Drunk driving is illegal for example, but people are allowed to eat with steak knives even though they might accidentally impale a dining companion.

**2. Nuclear weapons no longer represent a threat of global annihilation so the threat is exaggerated.**

Konrad M. Kressley, "Why Can't We Ban the Bomb?" The Futurist, Vol. 29, July-August 1995

Will nuclear weapons ever be used again? Possibly, but only in a limited fashion. Though only two nuclear devices have ever been detonated in war, it should not be forgotten that roughly 2,000 test explosions have taken place at some 35 sites around the world since 1945. Now, with so many weapons in so many hands, some use may be inevitable. Fortunately, we no longer face the prospect of global nuclear war. Paradoxically, the real potential for such a holocaust, involving "mutually assured destruction," constrained the superpowers with their thousands of warheads during the Cold War. Since neither side could escape fatal damage during a nuclear exchange, these huge, lethal arsenals served as deterrents to their actual deployment. Now that the superpowers are calling off the arms race, isolated future use of this weapon, while abhorrent, no longer raises the prospect of annihilation on a global scale.

**3. Nuclear weapons make war obsolete by threatening to destroy the territory the nations are fighting over meaning the lower risk.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Nuclear weapons do something different. They cheaply and predictably destroy whatever both sides are fighting for. It is just that ability to destroy the battlefield as well as the enemy, to leave war without winners, that makes them essential. Abolitionists and marginalizers have nothing realistic to offer to replace them in that role.

A/T The theory of nuclear deterrence is flawed.

**1. Nuclear weapons have had a stabilizing impact upon super power relations.**

Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," Western States Legal Foundation, June 27, 2000

Nuclear weapons played a pivotal role in international security during the latter half of the twentieth century. Despite rapid increases in communications, transportation, and weapons technology, there has been no large-scale strategic conflict since the Second World War. Nuclear weapons, as the most destructive instruments ever invented, had a stabilizing effect on superpower relations by making any conflict unacceptably costly. However, geopolitical change and the evolution of military technology suggest that the composition of our nuclear forces and our strategy for their employment may be different in the twenty-first century. The time is right for a fundamental rethinking of our expectations and requirements for these unique weapons.

**2. Nuclear weapons are used every day to deter.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

"Nuclear weapons are used every day." So says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's explaining -- concepts that were seemingly ignored in this week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on to explain, "to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection."

**3. US foreign policy must be based on the reality that nuclear deterrence is necessary.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated. Foreign policy must be based on this reality; and the U.S. should work with other nations on those achievable objectives that lower the risks of the spread of nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of nuclear weapons use.

**4. Nuclear weapons make war obsolete by destroying the territory the nations are fighting over.**

Michael M. May, "Fearsome Security: The Role of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Summer, 1995

Nuclear weapons do something different. They cheaply and predictably destroy whatever both sides are fighting for. It is just that ability to destroy the battlefield as well as the enemy, to leave war without winners, that makes them essential. Abolitionists and marginalizers have nothing realistic to offer to replace them in that role.

A/T Nuclear deterrence violates the just war doctrine.

**1. The Just War theory is not sufficient to condemn nuclear weapons.**

Michael Levin, "Philosophers Discover the Bomb," National Review, Vol. 39, December 4, 1987

A paragraph in this spirit from the pen of the eminent logician Michael Dummett gives a sense of the lurid fringes of the nuclear ethics literature: No one committed to defense by nuclear weapons can have any principled objection to murder. . . . To use them in any circumstances would plainly be murder. . . . The commission of acts of monstrous wickedness drives the perpetrators in some degree insane. Immediately after the end of the war with Japan, President Truman made a speech in which he blasphemously praised the wisdom of the Almighty in putting such terrible weapons in the hands of a people, the American people, too humane to use them . . . In fact, however, the principle of proportionality thus applied is vacuous, and yields no determination on nuclear war or any other issue. It is wrong, tautologically enough, to inflict unjustifiable harm, but that principle does not tell us when harm is justified and when it is not. Nor is it appropriate to treat deterrence as if it were tantamount to actually nuking Soviet babies.

**2. The just war theory is unjust.**

Yaron Brook & Alex Epstein, "Just War Theory vs American Self Defense, The Objective Standard, Spring 2006

What constitutes a "just cause" for war? The classic "just cause" that led Augustine to sanction war, and that Just War theorists have endorsed ever since, is a "humanitarian crisis": a situation in which a foreign people is suffering from aggression or oppression or genocide. Walzer goes so far as to say that ". . . the chief dilemma of international politics is whether people in danger should be rescued by military forces from outside."<sup>6</sup> Many Just War theorists hold that the sacrifice of American soldiers and American wealth for "peacekeeping" and "humanitarian" missions (where no threat to the U.S. is at stake)—such as in Sudan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia—is *morally mandatory*. Where in such "just causes" is the justice for the innocent, hardworking individuals who are forced to fund this "humanitarianism," let alone for those who *die* in such missions? The "justice" is to be found in Just War Theory's *standard of justice*: the altruistic notion that justice means selfless service to the needs of others. In practice this means that the world's "haves" (the productive, the virtuous, the happy) are to sacrifice for the sake of the world's "have-nots." American soldiers, in this view, should not fight for themselves and their freedom; they should fight to serve anyone who needs them.

**3. The Just War theory denies the just right to self defense.**

Yaron Brook & Alex Epstein, "Just War Theory vs American Self Defense, The Objective Standard, Spring 2006

While in name Just War Theory claims to uphold a right to self-defense, in substance it denies this right. Self-defense, the theory holds, is a "just cause" for war. This means that if the people of a nation are suffering aggression, oppression, or genocide, and are themselves capable of stopping it, they are morally entitled to respond militarily. But—and this is the crucial part—only under strict conditions. Aggression from another nation is a "just cause," according to Just War Theory, but only as a "last resort"—and only if the decision to go to war is motivated by "good intentions." (These qualifications apply to "humanitarian" "just causes" as well, but we will focus on their application to alleged wars of self-defense.)

A/T We must disarm now.

**1. Advocacy of disarmament is not based on reality.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

But above all, Mr. Schlesinger is a nuclear realist. Are we heading toward a nuclear-free world anytime soon? He shoots back a one-word answer: "No." I keep silent, hoping he will go on. "We will need a strong deterrent," he finally says, "and that is measured at least in decades -- in my judgment, in fact, more or less in perpetuity. The notion that we can abolish nuclear weapons reflects on a combination of American utopianism and American parochialism. . . . It's like the [1929] Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy . . . . It's not based upon an understanding of reality."

**2. Affirming would make the US more vulnerable.**

Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World The former defense secretary on the U.S. deterrent and the terrorist threat," The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009

In other words: Go ahead and wish for a nuclear-free world, but pray that you don't get what you wish for. A world without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with them, Mr. Schlesinger argues. "If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear weapons," he says, "what we would have is a number of countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors of breakout capabilities -- for intimidation purposes. . . . and finally, probably, a number of small clandestine stockpiles." This would make the U.S. more vulnerable.

**3. Disarmament would be counterproductive.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

We agree that the strongest possible measures must be taken to inhibit the acquisition of and roll back the possession of nuclear weapons. However, the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive. It will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.

**4. The US disarming will have no effect on states seeking nuclear capacity.**

Harold Brown and John Deutch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007

A nation that wishes to acquire nuclear weapons believes these weapons will improve its security. The declaration by the U.S. that it will move to eliminate nuclear weapons in a distant future will have no direct effect on changing this calculus. Indeed, nothing that the U.S. does to its nuclear posture will directly influence such a nation's (let alone a terrorist group's) calculus. Whatever their other merits (and they are significant), it is difficult to argue that a comprehensive test ban treaty, a "no first use" declaration by the U.S., a dramatic reduction in the number of deployed or total nuclear weapons in our stockpile, an end to the production of fissionable material will convince North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan or Israel to give up their nuclear weapons programs.

## Rebuttal Overviews

### 1<sup>st</sup> Affirmative

Affirming achieves the value of morality. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word 'ought' in the resolution which is defined as "be morally right." So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. The proper criterion for evaluating the morality of states possessing nuclear weapons is establishing moral intent. This is because, as James H. Dunham writes, "We are obliged to study the motive and the intent, the desires and the kind of thing desired, before a true moral judgment can be reached. Hence, a systematic analysis of mental phenomena is imperative as a prerequisite to the determination of consistent moral values." So, even if the negative can prove that possession of nuclear weapons leads to positive effects, these effects cannot be considered moral unless my case is refuted and the negative establishes possessing can be done with good intent. The thesis of my case is that possession of nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intent and so cannot be moral. My first point proves that the possession of nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intentions. Ramesh Thakur explains, "nuclear deterrence openly contemplates -- indeed must be directly based on -- the deliberate killing of people in the millions." My second point proves that if a particular act is immoral, then the threat to perform the action must also be immoral. Thakur explains, "If a particular act is evil, then the threat to do it must also be immoral; if nuclear war is evil, then threatening and preparing for such war is also morally wrong." Finally I prove that for nuclear deterrence to be credible, a nation must possess the immoral will to use them. Thakur concludes, "The threat to use nuclear weapons therefore needs to be backed up by contingency planning and preparations. A country cannot underwrite nuclear deterrence with an open policy of not using them." Thus, possessing nuclear weapons is revealing of immoral intent and we can affirm.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Affirmative

Affirming achieves the value of morality. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word 'ought' in the resolution which is defined as "be morally right." So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. The proper criterion for evaluating the morality of states possessing nuclear weapons is preventing proliferation. Remesh Thakur explains, "Given the possibility of wars, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can justifiably be posited as one of the greatest security problems facing the post-Cold War world." Thakur continues explain, "nuclearisation would trigger a fresh round of conventional arms escalation in the region and unleash diplomatic and military forces with unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences." Given the destructive power of these weapons this must be averted. The thesis of my case is that possession of nuclear weapons does lead to proliferation and so cannot be moral. The first point in my case demonstrates that the threat of nuclear proliferation could be avoided if nuclear states disarmed and the entire nuclear infrastructure were abolished. Thakur explains that, "The probability of 'nuclear breakout' can be decreased, even if not eliminated, by abolishing not just nuclear weapons but also the whole infrastructure underpinning the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons, including research, deployment, delivery, C3I systems, and nuclear doctrines." My second point shows that proliferation is seen as the rational security response to nuclear states. Thakur writes, "The acquisition of a deterrent weapons posture is regarded by policy-makers as a rational response to perceived threat." Finally I prove that, efforts to end nuclear proliferation are undermined by states possessing nuclear weapons. Thakur concludes, "Washington, with the world's most powerful military arsenal at its disposal, insists on the right to deal with its diffuse and uncertain threats with nuclear weapons. But it insists that India, despite facing clearly identifiable threats to its security from China and Pakistan, must forgo the nuclear option." Therefore, the possession of nuclear weapons exacerbates proliferation and so we must affirm.

### 1<sup>st</sup> Negative

Negating achieves the value of morality. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word 'ought' in the resolution which is defined as "be morally right." So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. The proper criterion for evaluating the morality of states possessing nuclear weapons is embracing a foreign policy of self interest. This is because, as Peter Schwartz explains, "Under such a foreign policy, Washington would not attempt to defend America in fits and starts, futilely trying to straddle the two roads of self-interest and self-sacrifice, attacking one terror-sponsor today while mollifying others the next day. Nor would it attempt to uphold self-interest as an amoral expediency—as advocated by the impractical pragmatists and their school of *realpolitik*. Rather, the designers of a rational foreign policy would understand that self-interest can be successfully defended only if it is embraced as a consistent, *moral* principle—a principle in keeping with America's founding values." The thesis of my case is that possessing nuclear weapons is in the self interest of the United States and so is moral. My first point proves that, nuclear weapons are necessary to deter attacks on vital interests of the US. Stephen Younger explains that, "Nuclear weapons are one component of an integrated defense strategy that includes diplomacy and conventional forces. The principal role of nuclear weapons was and continues to be that of deterring any potential adversaries from an attack on America or our vital interests." My second point proves that affirming would make the US more vulnerable. Melanie Kirkpatrick explains, "A world without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with them, Mr. Schlesinger argues. "If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear weapons," he says, "what we would have is a number of countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors of breakout capabilities -- for intimidation purposes. . . . and finally, probably, a number of small clandestine stockpiles." This means that getting rid of nuclear weapons would make the US vulnerable to attack from nations who developed them in the future and so we must negate.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Negative

Negating achieves the value of morality. Morality is the proper value for the round because of the word 'ought' in the resolution which is defined as "be morally right." So, the use of the word ought as the evaluative term in the resolution means we are debating whether or not state possession of nuclear weapons is moral or is in accord with what is generally accepted as right or proper. The proper criterion for evaluating the morality of states possessing nuclear weapons is reducing the chances of war. This is because war is inherently destructive to property and to the environment so it destroys what is necessary for life and life must be the basis, the foundation, of any moral code. Additionally, war asks citizens to become destroyers and killers as opposed to productive individuals. Citizens of a nation are asked to destroy, burn, and kill the property and people who could be fellow citizens or strangers from another land. In other words, it requires people to perform acts that they would generally consider immoral. The thesis of my case is that nuclear weapons are essential for preventing war because they make war unthinkable. My first point proves that nuclear weapons make maintaining peace essential for powerful states. Michael May explains, "the most basic argument is that nuclear weapons (and only they) transform peace among the most powerful states in the world from something that is nice to have but secondary to essential security interests as seen by governments, into the essential security interest of governments and governed alike." My second point proves that there is no alternative to nuclear weapons for making war obsolete. Michael May concludes, "Nuclear weapons are not all that is needed to make war obsolete, but they have no real substitute. Modern weapons such as those used in the Gulf War promise victory to the side that has them and leave the other side eager to build or buy them. Students of international politics have long noted this security dilemma: in the measure that a state's search for security through conventional armaments and alliances is successful, it makes its neighbors and rivals insecure and leads to wars that may be disastrous for everyone." This means that nuclear weapons actually make war less likely and so we must negate.

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x-Encarta Word English Dict  
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is also morally wrong.
- C) For nuclear deterrence to be credible,  
a nation must possess the immoral will  
to use them.  
x-Thakur  
Deterrence to be credible must convince  
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A) Nuclear weapons are necessary  
to deter attacks on vital interests  
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x-Younger

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x-Kirkpatrick

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War is inherently destructive to  
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destroy, burn, and kill the property  
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people to perform acts that they  
would generally consider immoral.  
War results in death, meaning it  
destroys the foundation of morality  
and many, if not most, of these lives  
are innocent lives who have had no  
say in the decisions of those in power.  
Finally, war is immoral because it is  
inherently destructive. Life requires  
productivity and so war is, in its  
essence, anti-life.

A. Nuclear weapons make maintaining  
peace essential for powerful  
states  
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The most basic argument is that  
nuclear weapons (and only they)  
transform peace among the most  
powerful states in the world from  
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Nuclear weapons are not all that is  
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insecure and leads to wars that may  
be disastrous for everyone.